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impact of harmonizing ruleS of 
procedure on the african human 
rightS SyStem
In November 2010, the Open Society 
Justice Initiative (OSJI), an organization 
dedicated to the use of litigation, advo-
cacy, technical assistance, and research to 
support international judicial processes, 
issued a report by Professors David C. 
Baluarte and Christian M. De Vos on 
the major regional human rights systems. 
From Judgment to Justice: Implementing 
International and Regional Human Rights 
Decisions examines the implementation of 
decisions from the African, European, and 
Inter-American regional human rights sys-
tems and the United Nations treaty bodies, 
and makes recommendations about how 
their decisions can be better enforced. 
Through its comparative study, the 
OSJI report underscores how the regional 
systems can draw lessons from one 
another’s experiences — for example, on 
the differentiation and coordination of a 
Commission and a Court. The African 
regional human rights system is currently 
implementing evolutionary changes to 
the interaction of its Commission and 
Court, seeking to address procedural and 
operational challenges. Created in 1986, 
the African Commission on Human and 
People’s Rights (Commission) is the 
regional body tasked with interpreting the 
African Charter on Human and People’s 
Rights. However, the decisions of the 
Commission are non-binding and have 
generally not been implemented by the 
responsible states. The more recent 2004 
creation of an African Court of Human 
and Peoples’ Rights raised initial hopes of 
greater accountability. Under the Protocol 
that established the Court, the Commission 
may refer cases to the Court when a 
State Party has failed to comply with 
Commission recommendations. Yet, this 
has rarely been done and, unfortunately, 
procedural impasses and uncertainties have 
hindered the Court’s progress. 
In 2010, the Commission harmonized 
its Rules of Procedure with those of the 
Court. These procedures clarify the rela-
tionship between the Commission and the 
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Court, and may help promote regional 
accountability. The OSJI report details the 
contents of these harmonized Rules, not yet 
publicly available, and offers a unique per-
spective on how the organs in the African 
system can coordinate future actions by 
implementing their harmonized Rules of 
Procedure. The report focuses on Rule 
115 (permitting the Commission to refer 
cases of state non-compliance to the Court 
after nine months), Rule 118 (establishing 
that the Court and the Commission shall 
meet at least once a year), and Rule 121(1) 
(creating a procedure for referral from the 
Commission to the Court); however, Rule 
121(1) serves as a lynchpin by clarifying 
the Commission’s ability to make non-
compliance referrals to the African Court.
The harmonization of the referral pro-
cedures is one of the most interesting 
and anticipated aspects of the new Rules. 
Much like the Inter-American system, the 
Rules for the African System allow states 
the opportunity to first comply with the 
Commission’s recommendations and also 
filter individual communications through 
the Commission before they reach the 
Court. Professor Baluarte told the Human 
Rights Brief that, “prior to the process 
[of] writ[ing] and implement[ing] the 
2010 Rules of Procedure, communication 
between the Commission and Court was 
limited,” but the referral mechanism has 
been strengthened by reading the new 
Rules 115, 118, and 121(1) together. 
The OSJI report is optimistic that the 
new referral process will increase account-
ability. Indeed, this optimism seems well 
placed where the Commission and Court 
have just made procedural history with the 
Commission’s first referral of the Libyan 
situation based on widespread and system-
atic violations of the African Charter. With 
the new Rules of Procedure not yet pub-
licly available, it may take time yet for the 
full impact of the new procedures to work 
its way through the system. However, the 
harmonized Rules of Procedure are a sig-
nificant accomplishment and an important 
first step demonstrating a commitment to 
protecting human rights and implementing 
judicial decisions in the region. 
the right to education aS a 
legally enforceable human right
March 8, 2011 marked the 100th anniver-
sary of International Women’s Day (IWD), 
a holiday to celebrate the economic, politi-
cal, and social achievements of women. In 
a message to commemorate the centennial 
anniversary, UN Secretary General Ban 
Ki-Moon stated that “in too many countries 
and societies, women remain second-class 
citizens,” in large part due to their limited 
access to education. “Although the gender 
gap in education is closing,” Ban Ki-Moon 
noted, “there are wide differences within 
and across countries, and far too many girls 
are still denied schooling, leave prema-
turely or complete school with few skills 
and fewer opportunities.” This statement 
supports a widely held understanding that 
education is a key driver of economic, 
political, and social advancement, and as 
such, an essential component of an effort 
to achieve greater gender equality.
The legal basis for upholding equal 
access to education is widely acknowl-
edged. The right to free, compulsory 
primary education for all is recognized 
by both the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) and the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. Education promotes 
gender equality by allowing individuals to 
access knowledge and methods for improv-
ing their lives. Accordingly, education not 
only enables women to take advantage of 
the same opportunities as men, but also 
fosters the understanding that achievement 
is not limited by gender. 
 NGOs support women’s right to edu-
cation through a variety of legal and non-
legal mechanisms. Litigation is an essential 
element of the efforts of many NGOs to 
promote the right to education for women. 
For instance, the Socio-Economic Rights 
and Accountability Project (SERAP) 
and Amnesty International brought a 
case against the Federal Government of 
Nigeria and the Universal Basic Education 
Commission (UBEC) of Nigeria before the 
ECOWAS Community Court of Justice. 
The Court declared that the right to educa-
tion is a legally enforceable human right. 
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NGOs also work to find new solutions 
to practical obstacles in the way of wom-
en’s access to education. For example, 
in Mozambique, where menstruation kept 
women and girls from school and jobs 
on account of the high costs of sanitary 
napkins, NGOs worked to create cheaper 
sanitary napkins made from banana leaves, 
and petitioned for taxes to be lifted on 
women’s hygiene products. The success of 
this project compelled the nearby Rwandan 
government to pay for pads for schoolgirls.
Despite 100 years of recognizing 
International Women’s Day, women and 
girls continue to be discriminated against 
in access to education. While international 
obligations and treaties exist, requiring 
equality between men and women, social 
prohibitions and discrimination continue 
to limit women’s right to equal education. 
NGOs are helping to challenge and change 
these practices through legal means and 
other creative solutions that ensure that 
women and girls will continue to progress 
toward equality, especially in education. 
Sikina S. Hasham, a L.L.M. candidate at the 
American University Washington College of 
Law, covers Inter-Governmental and Non-
Governmental Organizations for the Human 
Rights Brief.
international juStice and national 
Stability in lebanon 
In 2005, the government of Lebanon 
requested that the United Nations establish 
an international tribunal to prosecute those 
responsible for the February 14 assassina-
tion of former Lebanese Prime Minister 
Rafiq Hariri and 22 others that same year. 
In response, Security Council Resolution 
1757 created the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon (STL) and its governing statute in 
2007. Unique among the UN-established 
international tribunals, the STL applies 
only Lebanese law rather than a hybrid of 
national and international criminal law or 
solely international criminal law. Despite 
the fact that its establishment was initially 
based upon the Lebanese government’s 
request, many in Lebanon, particularly 
within the Syrian-backed Hezbollah move-
ment, oppose the STL and say that it is 
a foreign influence with too much power 
over the domestic judiciary. As a result, 
greater Hezbollah influence within the 
Lebanese government has raised concerns 
that the government will cease cooperating 
with the Tribunal.
In January 2011, as the STL prepared 
to issue its first sealed indictments, rumors 
surfaced that the indictments would impli-
cate Lebanese Hezbollah members in the 
Hariri assassination. When Prime Minister 
Saad Hariri — the son of the late Hariri — 
refused to bow to pressure and withdraw 
support for the Tribunal, ten Hezbollah-
affiliated ministers dramatically resigned 
from the government in protest, leading 
to a temporary governmental collapse and 
ousting Hariri from power. 
In the aftermath, the new Prime Minister-
designate, Najib Mikati has faced signifi-
cant pressure from Hezbollah to rescind 
Lebanese political support for the STL. 
The new Lebanese government, depen-
dent on the participation of its Hezbollah 
members, may seek to undermine STL’s 
legitimacy or deprive it of the 49 percent 
of funding for which the Lebanese govern-
ment is responsible. The STL has no inde-
pendent enforcement agency and relies on 
the Lebanese authorities for detention and 
jailing capabilities; thus, loss of govern-
ment support could seriously impair the 
STL with lengthy execution of warrants 
or a failure to “find” suspects. While the 
STL was designed by the United Nations 
to function independently of Lebanese 
politics, the Tribunal may face significant 
operational and enforcement problems.
The STL is a bold experiment for the 
United Nations. Unlike the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) or the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), which were 
set up to investigate and prosecute entire 
classes of international crimes committed 
throughout a conflict, the STL’s mandate 
covers certain specific acts of “terror-
ism,” as defined in Lebanese domestic law. 
Further, in contrast to the ICTY and ICTR, 
which originally provided functional judi-
cial authority where there arguably was 
none, the STL functions concordantly with 
a relatively established Lebanese judiciary. 
The STL was initially proposed because 
of concerns that the Lebanese court sys-
tem would be unable to maintain political 
independence throughout such high-profile 
investigations.
In addition to concerns of redundancy 
with the domestic judicial system, the 
STL is criticized for its slow progress 
and alleged overspending. The STL only 
began operations in 2009 and submitted 
the first, sealed indictments in early 2011. 
Yet, without having begun trials, the STL 
has spent upwards of U.S. $70 million over 
just the past fiscal year. To compare, the 
International Criminal Court spent U.S. 
$149 million over the same time period on 
investigations and prosecutions in several 
situations around the world. The STL’s 
response, that these early investigation 
costs will be reduced in coming years, is 
disputed since the trial process, involving 
an unknown number of suspects, may be 
long and costly. 
Despite the obstacles and political risk 
of continuing the STL, the United Nations 
and the STL have repeatedly indicated 
that Pre-Trial Judge Daniel Fransen would 
begin unsealing the indictments or order-
ing Lebanon to arrest those indicted. For 
the STL to achieve its mandate of bringing 
justice to those behind the February 2005 
assassinations, it must remain indepen-
dent from Lebanese politics in conducting 
investigations and prosecutions. The United 
Nations has expressed a firm commitment 
to the STL, but where the future of the 
Lebanese government remains uncertain, 
so too does the viability of the STL.
libyan criSiS preSentS opportunity 
for reforming the un human 
rightS council
In 2006, the United Nations Human 
Rights Commission, an inter-governmen-
tal human rights body under the General 
Assembly, was replaced with the Human 
Rights Council (UNHRC). The prede-
cessor Commission had struggled with 
legitimacy in light of its member states’ 
alleged human rights violations and a U.S. 
boycott under the Bush administration. 
The UNHRC was created in hopes that it 
would overcome the failings of its prede-
cessor, but it too has been the subject of 
substantial criticism. Accusations include 
that the Council fails to swiftly respond to 
human rights crises and that its own mem-
ber states such as China, Cuba, and Saudi 
Arabia have actively committed human 
rights abuses. In 2008, Secretary-General 
Ban Ki-Moon challenged the Council to 
insist on accountability and to respond to 
crises as they unfold. Recent developments 
in Libya have finally brought the type of 
response the Secretary-General was look-
ing for, possibly indicating a new commit-
ment to addressing tougher issues.
On February 25, 2011, the UNHRC 
held a special session to address the grow-
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ing human rights crisis in its member state, 
Libya. At the session, the UNHRC passed 
Resolution S-15/L.1 by consensus, calling 
on Libya to respect human rights and tak-
ing the unprecedented step of establishing 
a commission of inquiry to investigate alle-
gations of human rights abuses. On March 
1, 2011, the General Assembly took further 
action by suspending Libya’s membership 
in the UNHRC. The UNHRC’s unprec-
edented establishment of a commission 
of inquiry expands on previous country-
specific procedures, which have involved 
appointing experts to nations of concern, 
such as Burundi and Somalia, to monitor 
ongoing human rights abuses. These experts 
visit the country and periodically report 
findings to the Council. The UNHRC’s 
Libya commission is designed to investigate 
with an eye toward future accountability, 
rather than merely monitoring.
According to Sihasak Phuangketkeow, 
president of the UNHRC, the commission 
of inquiry will “investigate all alleged viola-
tions of human rights, [to] establish the facts 
surrounding those alleged violations and, 
also, if possible, [to] identify those who are 
responsible and consider accountability mea-
sures.” Unfortunately, despite its broad inves-
tigatory goals, the commission, like previous 
country-specific procedures, is dependent on 
authorities in Libya for access and coopera-
tion. Although a special session was called on 
February 25, 2011, to address the urgency of 
the Libya conflict, the commission will not 
report its findings to the UNHRC until June 
2011, during the Council’s next scheduled 
meeting. Further, the UNHRC has previously 
struggled with states that do not implement 
its recommendations and it is not clear Libya 
will respond to the commission of inquiry 
and its findings. Despite the shortcomings 
of the commission of inquiry, NGOs and 
editorials have lauded the commission’s aims 
of assessing responsibility and laying the 
groundwork for future action as a welcome 
change from the less effective mechanisms 
of the past.
The commission on Libya is just a first 
step and the Council now has an opportu-
nity to implement other positive changes. 
Libya’s membership in the UNHRC, 
although now suspended, reveals a flaw 
in the Council’s membership process. 
UNHRC membership is currently open to 
all member states. Admission is based on 
regional allocation, and although states are 
mandated to “take into account the contri-
bution of candidates [for the] promotion 
and protection of human rights” prior to 
voting, there is no safeguard to prevent the 
election of grave human rights violators.
To continue improving its function and 
legitimacy as a protector of human rights, 
the UNHRC could mandate that the peri-
odic reviews of prospective members be 
taken into account during the election pro-
cess. It could further disqualify those states 
with extremely poor human rights records. 
An improved vetting process for UNHRC 
membership could reward a state’s out-
standing contribution to human rights, 
rather than relying only on international 
support. More stringent admissions could, 
however, lead to unintended consequences. 
States might be less willing to cooperate 
with the UNHRC’s periodic reviews, or be 
unwilling to admit to human rights viola-
tions if faced with disqualification from 
the Council. Furthermore, standards that 
are too strict could unintentionally limit 
membership to developed countries with 
the wealth to implement and effectively 
protect human rights. Reformation of the 
membership process would be difficult, 
but not impossible, and would require the 
UNHRC to show awareness of the con-
cerns held by prospective member states.
Sergei magnitSKy caSe highlightS 
the office of the Special 
rapporteur on torture
Russian lawyer Sergei Magnitsky died 
in a Moscow jail on November 16, 2009 
after being arrested and jailed by the 
Russian government on charges of partici-
pation in a tax evasion scheme. Magnitsky 
denied these charges, claiming instead that 
his detention was a “personal vendetta” 
against him for implicating government 
officials and the mafia in a U.S. $230 mil-
lion tax fraud and corruption scandal. After 
being held for over eleven months in squalid 
conditions and allegedly denied medical 
services, Magnitsky was only eight days 
away from release when he died. The crimi-
nal case against him never reached trial.
REDRESS, an organization that seeks 
accountability for those who commit tor-
ture, requested UN Special Rapporteur on 
Torture Juan E. Mendez to investigate the 
suspicious nature of Magnitsky’s death. 
REDRESS alleges that the Russian govern-
ment isolated Magnitsky, prevented him 
from meeting with his family or counsel, 
and kept him in inhuman conditions in order 
to force him to retract his testimony against 
Russian officials. REDRESS asserts that 
these conditions amounted to torture as 
defined in Article 1 of the Convention 
against Torture (CAT), which Russia has 
ratified. Under this definition, torture is 
the intentional infliction of severe pain 
or suffering, whether physical or mental, 
in order to intimidate, coerce, or punish 
that individual. REDRESS further claims 
that the government violated Article 2(1) 
of the CAT because it failed to imple-
ment effective measures to prevent acts of 
torture in its jurisdiction. Nor has Russia 
adequately criminalized torture. In fact, 
under the Russian Criminal Code (RCC), 
torture does not apply to state officials 
acting within their official capacity, which 
is a fundamental element of the CAT 
definition. REDRESS accordingly chose to 
bring the case to the Special Rapporteur in 
order to bring international pressure on the 
Russian government as Russia conducts its 
own investigation.
Special Rapporteur Mendez is taking 
the first steps to address this matter, acting 
within his mandate under a resolution of 
the former UN Human Rights Commission. 
Though unable to comment on the inquiry 
itself, in his capacity as a visiting law pro-
fessor at American University Washington 
College of Law, Mendez explained, 
“Rapporteurships don’t have investigatory 
powers . . . . What they do is make inquires to 
seek clarification of circumstances.” Mendez 
further explained that, according to the 
general procedures of the Rapporteurship, 
his inquiry involves transmitting summaries 
of all credible and reliable torture allegations 
to the Russian government. The government 
is obligated under Article 13 of the CAT to 
investigate the allegations and respond. If 
the government responds, further exchanges 
may occur. At the conclusion of this dialogue, 
Mendez will submit his report to the Human 
Rights Council, which will then publish the 
information.
For its part, Russia claims to have com-
pleted a preliminary investigation, which 
found that those responsible for Magnitsky’s 
health during his incarceration committed 
no wrongdoing, and to be preparing to 
issue a formal report on the matter. The 
government also stated that any UN inqui-
ries into the matter would violate Russian 
legal procedures, although it does not 
specify how. Faced with this lack of coop-
eration, REDRESS could look to the UN 
Committee against Torture or the UN 
Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture for 
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alternative remedies. The Committee has 
the power to examine individual complaints 
alleging CAT violations. But, according to 
Committee guidelines Article 21, it may 
only do so if domestic remedies have been 
exhausted. This rule may be waived if 
domestic remedies are shown to be “unrea-
sonably prolonged or unlikely to bring 
effective relief.” If the Russian govern-
ment’s internal investigation precludes 
judicial remedies, then the Committee will 
likely be able to admit and consider the 
complaint against Russia. Another option 
is for the Committee to raise the incident in 
its 2011 annual report or during its periodic 
review of Russia’s compliance with the 
CAT, likely to occur in 2012.
In the meantime, Magnitsky’s family 
may be able to access psychological and 
other support services through an NGO 
funded by the UN Voluntary Fund for 
Victims. The fund offers grants to NGO 
programs that directly benefit victims and 
their families. The grant money is normally 
used to support NGOs that provide psycho-
logical, medical, social, legal, and financial 
assistance to victims and their families. 
In an average year, the fund receives U.S. 
$14 million in requests and awards U.S. 
$9 million. In fact, the Voluntary Fund 
is already one of the major grant funders 
of REDRESS, enabling it to do legal and 
advocacy work on behalf of people like 
the Manitsky family. A Board of Trustees 
consults with the Special Rapporteur 
on Torture and the Committee against 
Torture when reviewing past and new 
applications for grants. Thus in recogni-
tion of REDRESS’s important work on the 
Manitzky case, Mendez could support fur-
ther funding to the organization. Although 
such support services may help survivors 
of torture, legal redress itself must come 
from the wrongdoing party, in this case 
the individuals responsible for Magnitsky’s 
death and the Russian state.
Though the Magnitsky family no doubt 
faces numerous difficulties in its quest 
for redress, the involvement of the UN 
Special Rapporteur could potentially help 
in highlighting a significant human rights 
violation allegedly committed by Russia. 
The possibility of further action by the UN 
Committee against Torture or organizations 
operating with the support of grant funding 
from the Voluntary Fund demonstrates that 
UN bodies and mechanisms may facilitate 
justice and assistance for victims of torture 
and their families, even when the violation 
is committed by a member of the Security 
Council.
unamid’S difficultieS in darfur 
reflect outdated mandate 
When the fighting in Darfur became 
an international concern in June 2004, the 
African Union (AU) was first to respond 
with military force. It was not until 2007, 
after a series of UN Security Council reso-
lutions on Darfur, that the African Union-
United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur 
(UNAMID) was formed by UN Resolution 
1769, placing the African Union Force 
in Darfur (AMIS) under UN authority. 
Resolution 1769 aimed to ensure better 
protection for civilians and assist with the 
implementation of the 2006 Darfur Peace 
Agreement (DPA). 
UNAMID has struggled to provide 
effective aid, often seeming a step behind 
real diplomatic and political conditions on 
the ground. Already extended three times, 
UNAMID’s mandate is set to terminate on 
July 31, 2011 if not reauthorized. Although 
the DPA is largely outdated, it is unlikely 
that a new peace agreement will come out of 
ongoing negotiations in Doha by the end of 
July. Nevertheless, if extended, UNAMID’s 
mandate should be updated to reflect the 
DPA’s failure and operation’s primary pur-
pose going forward: to protect civilian and 
aid groups in the increasingly violent region.
Widely criticized even in 2006, many 
now believe that the DPA has fully col-
lapsed. Minni Minawi’s faction of the 
Sudan Liberation Army (SLA-Minawi) 
was the only movement of many that 
actually signed the DPA, and after five 
years the government has failed to imple-
ment almost any aspect of the agreement. 
Further, SLA-Minawi and the Sudanese 
Army resumed fighting in early 2011. 
Today, new peace talks are taking place in 
Doha, Qatar between the Sudanese govern-
ment and Darfur rebel groups, including 
the well established Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM) and the uneasy alli-
ance, Liberation and Justice Movement 
(LJM). While promising, the peace talks 
are threatened by the chief mediator Djibril 
Bassole’s departure, multiple extensions, 
and the splintering of the LJM.
While UNAMID still has substantial 
military strength — over 22,000 troops, 
military observers, and police officers — 
the DPA, now effectively defunct, remains 
a central component of the mandate. 
Further, human rights organizations have 
claimed UNAMID is slow to respond in 
protecting civilians and is too deferential to 
the wishes of Sudan. UNAMID is required 
to inform the government of any military 
movement, which in practice operates as a 
de facto request for permission. Aid groups 
allege such limitations have significantly 
hampered the mission’s effectiveness.
In actuality, UNAMID’s mandate would 
allow much broader operations. Thus, it 
could be argued that it is failing to fulfill its 
mandate — reflecting either problems with 
implementation, problems with design, or 
both. When a peacekeeping force operates 
outside its mandate, the UN has in practice 
generally followed one of four paths. It can 
continue the mission under the existing 
mandate, but authorize some flexibility for 
the mission to adapt to changing conditions 
on the ground and thereby avoid having 
to renegotiate the mandate with the host 
country. Alternatively, the UN could request 
Security Council approval to alter the man-
date, or even try to negotiate a new mandate 
with the host nation. Finally, the UN could 
terminate the mission. Termination of the 
mission, however, is the least desirable alter-
native, since it could further destabilize the 
region and lead to the collapse of the current 
peace talks in Doha. 
If the UN chooses to keep UNAMID 
operating under the current mandate, it 
would likely do so in order to affirm that the 
mission to protect civilians is now its primary 
function. UNAMID’s mandate also provides 
for it to assist with the implementation of 
any future peace agreements, and UNAMID 
could thus find itself implementing whatever 
new agreement may come out of the cur-
rent peace talks in Doha. Furthermore, with 
its military strength, UNAMID could take 
a more active role in preventing violence 
against civilians. UNAMID could model 
itself after the UN Preventive Deployment 
Force (UNPREDEP), the successful mission 
in Macedonia, which aggressively patrolled 
and combated arms trafficking. Such a role 
may, however, make UNAMID more vul-
nerable to casualties, which have already 
reached 81 since the mission’s founding. 
Although UNAMID might for this reason 
be unwilling to take stronger military action, 
this path would be preferable to increased 
cooperation with the Sudanese government.
Thus, UNAMID is most likely to con-
tinue under the current mandate or one 
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adapted slightly to the changing situation. 
Whether it can effectively protect civilians 
under an ongoing or altered mandate, how-
ever, remains an open question. 
Thomas Avery, a J.D. Candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, covers Inter-Governmental and 
Non-Governmental Organizations for the 
Human Rights Brief. 
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